Senses of Being in Plato's Timaeus

In this paper I discuss the problem of the meanings of the verb ‘be’ in Plato’s Timaeus. My claim is that, at least in that dialogue, existence emerges as the main and autonomous meaning of the verb ‘be’, contrary to the widespread view first defended in a series of studies by Charles Kahn according to which, in the Greek language and in Plato’s philosophy, the verb ‘be’ basically has a copulative- predicative and, more specifically, a truth-related meaning. I consider and examine some passages from the Timaeus (27d5–28a4, 29b3–c3, 37e3–38b3, 51b7– 52a7) where the concept of existence seems to be expressed in a clear and definite way by the use of the verb ‘be.’ I conclude by making some remarks on how we should understand the notion of existence, not least with reference to the problem of truth, within Plato’s philosophy and the Timaeus in particular.