Storicità del soggetto ed etica nel buddhismo indiano

The article shows how the interpretation of the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of paṭiccasamuppāda (“dependent origination”), set out in the Pali Canon, can and should be facilitated by the use of categories such as “historical” and “finite.” The subject, in the description that results from the paṭiccasamuppāda, is reduced to a sum of historical facts and is therefore understood as radically contingent. In such a context, moral action cannot be rationally founded, since there is no concept of essential subjectivity on which to base it. This situation is analogous to that in which contemporary antifoundationalist thought has found itself. And even the solution provided by a contemporary philosopher like Richard Rorty, namely a sense of commonality in suffering, is analogous to the Buddhist one. These analogies could be a prelude to a “fusion of horizons” between the thought of ancient Buddhism and some important trends of contemporary thought.