Moving Target Defense and Cyber Deception emerged in recent years as two key proactive cyber defense approaches, contrasting with the static nature of the traditional reactive cyber defense. The key insight behind these approaches is to impose an asymmetric disadvantage for the attacker by using deception and randomization techniques to create a dynamic attack surface. Moving Target Defense (MTD) typically relies on system randomization and diversification, while Cyber Deception is based on decoy nodes and fake systems to deceive attackers. However, current Moving Target Defense techniques are complex to manage and can introduce high overheads, while Cyber Deception nodes are easily recognized and avoided by adversaries. This paper presents DOLOS, a novel architecture that unifies Cyber Deception and Moving Target Defense approaches. DOLOS is motivated by the insight that deceptive techniques are much more powerful when integrated into production systems rather than deployed alongside them. DOLOS combines typical Moving Target Defense techniques, such as randomization, diversity, and redundancy, with cyber deception and seamlessly integrates them into production systems through multiple layers of isolation. We extensively evaluate DOLOS against a wide range of attackers, ranging from automated malware to professional penetration testers, and show that DOLOS is effective in slowing down attacks and protecting the integrity of production systems. We also provide valuable insights and considerations for the future development of MTD techniques based on our findings.

DOLOS: A Novel Architecture for Moving Target Defense / Pagnotta, Giulio; DE GASPARI, Fabio; Hitaj, Dorjan; Andreolini, Mauro; Colajanni, Michele; Mancini, Luigi V.. - In: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY. - ISSN 1556-6013. - (2023). [10.1109/TIFS.2023.3318964]

DOLOS: A Novel Architecture for Moving Target Defense

Giulio Pagnotta
Primo
Membro del Collaboration Group
;
Fabio De Gaspari
Secondo
Membro del Collaboration Group
;
Dorjan Hitaj
Membro del Collaboration Group
;
Mauro Andreolini
Membro del Collaboration Group
;
Luigi V. Mancini
Ultimo
Membro del Collaboration Group
2023

Abstract

Moving Target Defense and Cyber Deception emerged in recent years as two key proactive cyber defense approaches, contrasting with the static nature of the traditional reactive cyber defense. The key insight behind these approaches is to impose an asymmetric disadvantage for the attacker by using deception and randomization techniques to create a dynamic attack surface. Moving Target Defense (MTD) typically relies on system randomization and diversification, while Cyber Deception is based on decoy nodes and fake systems to deceive attackers. However, current Moving Target Defense techniques are complex to manage and can introduce high overheads, while Cyber Deception nodes are easily recognized and avoided by adversaries. This paper presents DOLOS, a novel architecture that unifies Cyber Deception and Moving Target Defense approaches. DOLOS is motivated by the insight that deceptive techniques are much more powerful when integrated into production systems rather than deployed alongside them. DOLOS combines typical Moving Target Defense techniques, such as randomization, diversity, and redundancy, with cyber deception and seamlessly integrates them into production systems through multiple layers of isolation. We extensively evaluate DOLOS against a wide range of attackers, ranging from automated malware to professional penetration testers, and show that DOLOS is effective in slowing down attacks and protecting the integrity of production systems. We also provide valuable insights and considerations for the future development of MTD techniques based on our findings.
2023
moving target defense; active defense; cyber deception; intrusion detection
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
DOLOS: A Novel Architecture for Moving Target Defense / Pagnotta, Giulio; DE GASPARI, Fabio; Hitaj, Dorjan; Andreolini, Mauro; Colajanni, Michele; Mancini, Luigi V.. - In: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY. - ISSN 1556-6013. - (2023). [10.1109/TIFS.2023.3318964]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1691164
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