The policy iteration method is a classical algorithm for solving optimal control problems. We introduce a policy iteration method for Mean Field Games systems and we prove, under a classical monotonicity assumption on the coupling cost, the convergence of this procedure to the solution of the problem.

A policy iteration method for mean field games / Camilli, Fabio. - In: IFAC PAPERSONLINE. - ISSN 2405-8971. - 55:30(2022), pp. 406-411. (Intervento presentato al convegno 25th IFAC Symposium on Mathematical Theory of Networks and Systems, MTNS 2022 tenutosi a Bayreuth, Germania) [10.1016/j.ifacol.2022.11.087].

A policy iteration method for mean field games

Fabio Camilli
2022

Abstract

The policy iteration method is a classical algorithm for solving optimal control problems. We introduce a policy iteration method for Mean Field Games systems and we prove, under a classical monotonicity assumption on the coupling cost, the convergence of this procedure to the solution of the problem.
2022
25th IFAC Symposium on Mathematical Theory of Networks and Systems, MTNS 2022
convergence rate; Mean Field Games; policy iteration
04 Pubblicazione in atti di convegno::04c Atto di convegno in rivista
A policy iteration method for mean field games / Camilli, Fabio. - In: IFAC PAPERSONLINE. - ISSN 2405-8971. - 55:30(2022), pp. 406-411. (Intervento presentato al convegno 25th IFAC Symposium on Mathematical Theory of Networks and Systems, MTNS 2022 tenutosi a Bayreuth, Germania) [10.1016/j.ifacol.2022.11.087].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1675429
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