An unattended wireless sensor network (UWSN) might collect valuable data representing an attractive target for the adversary. Since a sink visits the network infrequently, unattended sensors cannot immediately off-load data to some safe external entity. With sufficient time between sink visits, a powerful mobile adversary can easily compromise sensor-collected data. In this paper, we propose two schemes (CoMAC and ExCo) that leverage sensor co-operation to achieve data authentication. These schemes use standard (and inexpensive) symmetric cryptographic primitives coupled with key evolution and few messages exchange. We provide security analysis for proposed schemes and assess their effectiveness via simulations. We show that proposed schemes cope well with real WSN issues, such as message loss and sensor failure. We also compare the two schemes with respect to robustness and overhead, which allows network designers to carefully select the right scheme and tune appropriate system parameters. Copyright 2009 ACM.

Collaborative authentication in unattended WSNs / Pietro, R. D.; Soriente, C.; Spognardi, A.; Tsudik, G.. - (2009), pp. 237-244. (Intervento presentato al convegno 2nd ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security, WiSec'09 tenutosi a Zurich; Switzerland) [10.1145/1514274.1514307].

Collaborative authentication in unattended WSNs

Spognardi A.;
2009

Abstract

An unattended wireless sensor network (UWSN) might collect valuable data representing an attractive target for the adversary. Since a sink visits the network infrequently, unattended sensors cannot immediately off-load data to some safe external entity. With sufficient time between sink visits, a powerful mobile adversary can easily compromise sensor-collected data. In this paper, we propose two schemes (CoMAC and ExCo) that leverage sensor co-operation to achieve data authentication. These schemes use standard (and inexpensive) symmetric cryptographic primitives coupled with key evolution and few messages exchange. We provide security analysis for proposed schemes and assess their effectiveness via simulations. We show that proposed schemes cope well with real WSN issues, such as message loss and sensor failure. We also compare the two schemes with respect to robustness and overhead, which allows network designers to carefully select the right scheme and tune appropriate system parameters. Copyright 2009 ACM.
2009
2nd ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security, WiSec'09
Authentication; Mobile adversary; Wireless sensor networks
04 Pubblicazione in atti di convegno::04b Atto di convegno in volume
Collaborative authentication in unattended WSNs / Pietro, R. D.; Soriente, C.; Spognardi, A.; Tsudik, G.. - (2009), pp. 237-244. (Intervento presentato al convegno 2nd ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security, WiSec'09 tenutosi a Zurich; Switzerland) [10.1145/1514274.1514307].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1673094
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