«Enattivismo», intenzionalità, simulazione computazionale

The question of the eligibility of the intentional action model calls into question the theses on the limits of conscious control of action and on the overcoming of the dualist conception of the mind-brain relationship. In this regard, the theme of the heterogenesis of ends – present for some time in the sociological tradition – finds its origin in the dynamics of social interdependence within which teleologically oriented acts fall. All this has obvious implications with regard to computational designs, thanks to which it is possible to include in the model aspects inherent in mental states and motives of teleological and non-teleological action. Moreover, one of the emerging arguments about the philosophy of the mind is undoubtedly that which refers to the so-called “enactivist” theory of the embodied mind, whose basic principle alludes to the inseparability of mental and bodily life.