In a game with pre-play bilateral communication, messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements. We hypothesize that individuals’ inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor informal agreements. We report supporting results from an experiment.
Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication / Bartolomeo, Di; Martin, Dufwenberg; Stefano, Papa; Francesco, Passarelli. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - 222:(2023), p. 110931. [10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110931]
Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication
Di Bartolomeo;
2023
Abstract
In a game with pre-play bilateral communication, messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements. We hypothesize that individuals’ inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor informal agreements. We report supporting results from an experiment.File allegati a questo prodotto
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