Strategic ambiguity and risk in alternating pie-sharing experiments

We experimentally study a class of pie-sharing games with alternating roles from a decision-making perspective. For this, we consider a variant of a two-stage alternating-offer game which introduces an imbalance in the protagonists’ bargaining powers. This game class enables us to investigate how exposure to risk and strategic ambiguity affects one’s bargaining behaviour. Two structural econometric models of behaviour, a naïve and a sophisticated one, capture remarkably well the observed deviations from the game-theoretic benchmark. Our findings indicate, in particular, that a higher exposure to strategic ambiguity leads to a behaviour that is less responsive to the game’s parameters and to distorted, yet consistent, beliefs about other’s behaviour. We also find evidence of a backward-reasoning whereby first-stage decisions relate to the second-stage ones but which do not call for the counterfactual reasoning that characterises rationality in such settings.