The paper analyses the impact of a preventive measure aimed at fighting the criminal organizations’ activities on the bank-firm relationship in the four Italian regions with the highest density of mafia over the period 2004–2016. Taking advantage of the staggered firm-level anti-mafia enforcement actions, we implement a difference-in-differences approach and find that after entering judicial administration mafia-infiltrated firms experience a 19 per cent contraction of bank credit and have a higher probability of being credit rationed than a matched sample of legal companies. We also find that firms confiscated from the mafia experience a negative change in some demand-driven (value of production) and supply-driven (profitability) determinants of loans. Finally, we study whether confiscation of infiltrated firms produces externalities on non-infiltrated companies, and show that banks do not reassess the overall credit risk in local markets.
Anti-mafia law enforcement and lending in mafia lands. Evidence from judicial administration in Italy / Calamunci, Francesca M.; De Benedetto, Marco Alberto; Silipo, Damiano Bruno. - In: THE B.E. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY. - ISSN 1935-1682. - 21:3(2021), pp. 1067-1106. [10.1515/bejeap-2020-0353]
Anti-mafia law enforcement and lending in mafia lands. Evidence from judicial administration in Italy
Calamunci, Francesca M.
;
2021
Abstract
The paper analyses the impact of a preventive measure aimed at fighting the criminal organizations’ activities on the bank-firm relationship in the four Italian regions with the highest density of mafia over the period 2004–2016. Taking advantage of the staggered firm-level anti-mafia enforcement actions, we implement a difference-in-differences approach and find that after entering judicial administration mafia-infiltrated firms experience a 19 per cent contraction of bank credit and have a higher probability of being credit rationed than a matched sample of legal companies. We also find that firms confiscated from the mafia experience a negative change in some demand-driven (value of production) and supply-driven (profitability) determinants of loans. Finally, we study whether confiscation of infiltrated firms produces externalities on non-infiltrated companies, and show that banks do not reassess the overall credit risk in local markets.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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