We suggest an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of cooperation in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players’ willingness to cooperate and as signals pursuing individualistic objectives like publicizing one’s bargaining abilities or eliciting those of the opponent.

An experiment on prisoner's dilemma with confirmed proposals / Attanasi, Giuseppe; Garc('(i))a-Gallego, Aurora; Georgantz('(i))s, Nikolaos; Montesano, Aldo. - In: ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES. - ISSN 0749-5978. - 120:2(2013), pp. 216-227. [10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.12.001]

An experiment on prisoner's dilemma with confirmed proposals

Giuseppe Attanasi
;
2013

Abstract

We suggest an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of cooperation in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players’ willingness to cooperate and as signals pursuing individualistic objectives like publicizing one’s bargaining abilities or eliciting those of the opponent.
2013
prisoner’s dilemma; bargaining; confirmed proposals; cooperative agreement; tacit communication
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
An experiment on prisoner's dilemma with confirmed proposals / Attanasi, Giuseppe; Garc('(i))a-Gallego, Aurora; Georgantz('(i))s, Nikolaos; Montesano, Aldo. - In: ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES. - ISSN 0749-5978. - 120:2(2013), pp. 216-227. [10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.12.001]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1622234
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