We study in a theoretical and experimental setting the interaction between belief- dependent preferences and reputation building in a finitely repeated trust game. We focus mainly on the effect of guilt aversion. In a simple two-type model, we analyze the effect of reputation building in the presence of guilt-averse trustees and derive behavioral pre- dictions. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where we elicit information on trustees’ belief-dependent preferences and disclose it to the paired trustor before the repeated game.

Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: experimental analysis of a repeated trust game / Attanasi, Giuseppe; Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Manzoni, Elena; Nagel, Rosemarie. - In: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION. - ISSN 0167-2681. - 167:C(2019), pp. 341-360. [10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.002]

Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: experimental analysis of a repeated trust game

Giuseppe Attanasi
;
2019

Abstract

We study in a theoretical and experimental setting the interaction between belief- dependent preferences and reputation building in a finitely repeated trust game. We focus mainly on the effect of guilt aversion. In a simple two-type model, we analyze the effect of reputation building in the presence of guilt-averse trustees and derive behavioral pre- dictions. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where we elicit information on trustees’ belief-dependent preferences and disclose it to the paired trustor before the repeated game.
2019
repeated psychological game; reputation; guilt; almost complete information
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: experimental analysis of a repeated trust game / Attanasi, Giuseppe; Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Manzoni, Elena; Nagel, Rosemarie. - In: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION. - ISSN 0167-2681. - 167:C(2019), pp. 341-360. [10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.002]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1622220
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