Psychological game theory can contribute to renew the analysis of unethical behavior by providing insights on the nature of the moral costs of dishonesty. We investigate the moral costs of embezzlement in situations where donors need intermediaries to transfer their donations to recipients and where donations can be embezzled before they reach the re- cipients. We design a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether in- termediaries in the laboratory suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion affects the decision to embezzle. We show that the proportion of guilt-averse intermediaries is the same irrespective of the direction of guilt and guilt aversion reduces embezzlement. Structural estimates indicate no difference in the effect of guilt aversion toward the donor and toward the recipient on intermediaries’ behavior. This is striking as embezzlement af- fects the earnings of the recipient but not those of the donor. It shows that guilt aversion matters even when decisions have no direct monetary consequences.

Embezzlement and guilt aversion / Attanasi, Giuseppe; Rimbaud, Claire; Claire Villeval, Marie. - In: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION. - ISSN 0167-2681. - 167:(2019), pp. 409-429. [10.1016/j.jebo.2019.02.002]

Embezzlement and guilt aversion

Giuseppe Attanasi
;
2019

Abstract

Psychological game theory can contribute to renew the analysis of unethical behavior by providing insights on the nature of the moral costs of dishonesty. We investigate the moral costs of embezzlement in situations where donors need intermediaries to transfer their donations to recipients and where donations can be embezzled before they reach the re- cipients. We design a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether in- termediaries in the laboratory suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion affects the decision to embezzle. We show that the proportion of guilt-averse intermediaries is the same irrespective of the direction of guilt and guilt aversion reduces embezzlement. Structural estimates indicate no difference in the effect of guilt aversion toward the donor and toward the recipient on intermediaries’ behavior. This is striking as embezzlement af- fects the earnings of the recipient but not those of the donor. It shows that guilt aversion matters even when decisions have no direct monetary consequences.
2019
embezzlement; dishonesty; guilt aversion; psychological game theory; experiment
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
Embezzlement and guilt aversion / Attanasi, Giuseppe; Rimbaud, Claire; Claire Villeval, Marie. - In: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION. - ISSN 0167-2681. - 167:(2019), pp. 409-429. [10.1016/j.jebo.2019.02.002]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1622214
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