In this paper, various aspects related to Leakage Power Analysis (LPA) attacks to cryptographic circuits are discussed. These attack aim at recoverin. The secret key through measurements of chip static (leakage) power, and are a serious threat to the information security of cryptographic circuits in sub-100 nm CMOS technologies. A theoretical analysis of LPA attacks is developed to predic. The result of practical attacks. In particular, a closed-form expression is provided for the correlation coefficient betwee. The estimated and measured leakage as a function oy the parameters related to the attack. This permits to gain an insight int. The fundamental mechanisms involved in LPA attacks. Since LPA attacks are potentially sensitive to threshold voltage variations. The impact of process variations is also analyzed in detail. Results show that LPA attacks are expected to be robust against process variations also i. The next process generations. Assumptions and results are finally validated through simulations on a 65-nm CMOS technology and measurements. © 2009 IEEE.
Leakage power analysis attacks: Theoretical analysis and impact of variations / Alioto, M.; Giancane, L.; Scotti, G.; Trifiletti, A.. - (2009), pp. 85-88. (Intervento presentato al convegno 2009 16th IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Circuits and Systems, ICECS 2009 tenutosi a Yasmine Hammamet, tun) [10.1109/ICECS.2009.5410929].
Leakage power analysis attacks: Theoretical analysis and impact of variations
Giancane L.;Scotti G.;Trifiletti A.
2009
Abstract
In this paper, various aspects related to Leakage Power Analysis (LPA) attacks to cryptographic circuits are discussed. These attack aim at recoverin. The secret key through measurements of chip static (leakage) power, and are a serious threat to the information security of cryptographic circuits in sub-100 nm CMOS technologies. A theoretical analysis of LPA attacks is developed to predic. The result of practical attacks. In particular, a closed-form expression is provided for the correlation coefficient betwee. The estimated and measured leakage as a function oy the parameters related to the attack. This permits to gain an insight int. The fundamental mechanisms involved in LPA attacks. Since LPA attacks are potentially sensitive to threshold voltage variations. The impact of process variations is also analyzed in detail. Results show that LPA attacks are expected to be robust against process variations also i. The next process generations. Assumptions and results are finally validated through simulations on a 65-nm CMOS technology and measurements. © 2009 IEEE.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
