Environment is a public good whose preservation requires some type of intervention. Use of natural resources for economic activities should be regulated by the local communities; however, this can have in turn external effects on other communities. Environment then takes the double nature of local and global public good, requiring intervention of different levels of governments, whose interplay may raise further conflicts. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we survey the literature on conflicts arising from the alternative uses of land and natural resources and discuss the effects and policy implications of the interplay between different governments. Second, we focus on the role of strategic interactions in the environmental governance and the implied policy trade-offs and present a formal policy game with potential conflicts between central and local authorities. The model aims to describe the circumstances according to which the lack of coordination between local and central authorities leads to under- or over-provision of natural resources and environment preservation.
Natural resources and environment preservation. Strategic substitutability vs. complementarity in global and local public good provision / Acocella, N.; Di Bartolomeo, G.. - In: INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS. - ISSN 1932-1465. - 13:3-4(2019), pp. 203-227. [10.1561/101.00000109]
Natural resources and environment preservation. Strategic substitutability vs. complementarity in global and local public good provision
Acocella N.
;Di Bartolomeo G.
2019
Abstract
Environment is a public good whose preservation requires some type of intervention. Use of natural resources for economic activities should be regulated by the local communities; however, this can have in turn external effects on other communities. Environment then takes the double nature of local and global public good, requiring intervention of different levels of governments, whose interplay may raise further conflicts. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we survey the literature on conflicts arising from the alternative uses of land and natural resources and discuss the effects and policy implications of the interplay between different governments. Second, we focus on the role of strategic interactions in the environmental governance and the implied policy trade-offs and present a formal policy game with potential conflicts between central and local authorities. The model aims to describe the circumstances according to which the lack of coordination between local and central authorities leads to under- or over-provision of natural resources and environment preservation.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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