The systemic structure and evolutionary rules of European defense can be understood starting from the post-bipolar context, to be analyzed according to the principles of chaotic systems. To reduce complexity, we introduce the “deinometric” model, that cross-correlates interdependence and competition variables. It shows that European security and defense are subject to a force field that can be described by the category of “pleiocriticality”: a state characterized by proliferation of medium-high impact and high probability risks. However, Eu member States act within an intergovernamental framework, pursuing their strategic interests. The latter are linked to the decision-making mechanisms of Pesco, Ei2 and the Aachen Treaty by an abductive logic (a new formulation of which is provided): a) to analyze decision-making processes, we introduce the “buleutropic” model, which cross-correlates structuring and widening variables; b) Germany is the dominant economy in Europe but lacks strength in defense, while France is a leader in the sector; c) therefore, Germany has promoted an enlarged unanimity-based Pesco to preserve its primacy, France has launched an exclusive informal Ei2 to try to change the balance of power, and the “epiplocist” Aachen Treaty acts as a “clearing house” between them. If Ei2 keeps on rising, to be competitive Pesco will have to evolve its decision-making mechanisms. The Italian interest should be to carry out bilateral agreements with France and Germany. Within a scenario of hybrid and cyber warfare, Eu should extend the perimeter of its technological sovereignty to de facto dual use 5G, on the model of the Galileo satellite system.

Strumenti analitici per la difesa europea. Modello deinometrico e pleiocriticità, modello buleutropico e interessi strategici nazionali / Barbaro, Francesco. - In: GEOPOLITICA. - ISSN 2009-9193. - IX:1-2/2020(2020), pp. 59-86.

Strumenti analitici per la difesa europea. Modello deinometrico e pleiocriticità, modello buleutropico e interessi strategici nazionali

Francesco Barbaro
2020

Abstract

The systemic structure and evolutionary rules of European defense can be understood starting from the post-bipolar context, to be analyzed according to the principles of chaotic systems. To reduce complexity, we introduce the “deinometric” model, that cross-correlates interdependence and competition variables. It shows that European security and defense are subject to a force field that can be described by the category of “pleiocriticality”: a state characterized by proliferation of medium-high impact and high probability risks. However, Eu member States act within an intergovernamental framework, pursuing their strategic interests. The latter are linked to the decision-making mechanisms of Pesco, Ei2 and the Aachen Treaty by an abductive logic (a new formulation of which is provided): a) to analyze decision-making processes, we introduce the “buleutropic” model, which cross-correlates structuring and widening variables; b) Germany is the dominant economy in Europe but lacks strength in defense, while France is a leader in the sector; c) therefore, Germany has promoted an enlarged unanimity-based Pesco to preserve its primacy, France has launched an exclusive informal Ei2 to try to change the balance of power, and the “epiplocist” Aachen Treaty acts as a “clearing house” between them. If Ei2 keeps on rising, to be competitive Pesco will have to evolve its decision-making mechanisms. The Italian interest should be to carry out bilateral agreements with France and Germany. Within a scenario of hybrid and cyber warfare, Eu should extend the perimeter of its technological sovereignty to de facto dual use 5G, on the model of the Galileo satellite system.
2020
deinometric model and pleiocriticality; buleutropic model and national strategic interests; chaos theory and abductive logic applied to european defense
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Strumenti analitici per la difesa europea. Modello deinometrico e pleiocriticità, modello buleutropico e interessi strategici nazionali / Barbaro, Francesco. - In: GEOPOLITICA. - ISSN 2009-9193. - IX:1-2/2020(2020), pp. 59-86.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1607586
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