In monetary unions time-inconsistency provides the rationale for monetary conservativeness and against fiscal coordination. However, this depends on the assumption of exogenous labor markets. Once wage-setting behavior is explicitly modeled, fiscal coordination and less conservative central bankers improve the performance.
Monetary conservatism and fiscal coordination in a monetary union / Acocella, Nicola; DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni; Tirelli, P.. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - STAMPA. - 94:1(2007), pp. 56-63. [10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.002]
Monetary conservatism and fiscal coordination in a monetary union
ACOCELLA, Nicola;DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni;
2007
Abstract
In monetary unions time-inconsistency provides the rationale for monetary conservativeness and against fiscal coordination. However, this depends on the assumption of exogenous labor markets. Once wage-setting behavior is explicitly modeled, fiscal coordination and less conservative central bankers improve the performance.File allegati a questo prodotto
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
