This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.
Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games / Acocella, Nicola; DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - STAMPA. - 90:(2006), pp. 213-218. [10.1016/j.econlet.2005.08.002]
Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games
ACOCELLA, Nicola;DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni
2006
Abstract
This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.File allegati a questo prodotto
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