The paper analyzes judgment no. 242/2019 of the Constitutional Court, which rewrote art. 580 of the Italian Criminal Code, by a very detailed manipulative and additive ruling, after the previous order n. 207/2018, by which the same Court gave Italian Parliament one year to amend the current legislation in the sense indicated (without the Parliament obeying). According to the judgment, aid to suicide remains a crime, but the person who facilitates the execution of the suicidal purpose is no longer punishable in cases where the suicidal aspirant is in certain conditions, verified by public structures of the national health system and by the territorially competent ethical committees. One of the conditions is that the person is kept alive by life-support treatments and suffering from an irreversible pathology, source of physical or psychological suffering which he or she considers intolerable. The sentence, which is a “legislative” and derogating rule, is criticized by the Author as it opens a gap in the guarantees placed to protect right to life, despite the fact that the Court defines it the most inviolable right and premise for the exercise of all other rights; the judgment is then based on the questionable assumption that refusing health treatments is the same as intentionally procuring death, as well as on the idea that suicide aid could be qualified as health treatment, in disagreement with the opinion of scientific medical societies. However, the Author considers appreciable that the Court has clarified that from the right to life derives the State’s duty to protect life and not to recognize aid to die; and that, consequently, there is no duty of the doctors to grant these requests. Equally appreciable are the statements on the priority of palliative care, a pre-requisite for other choices, an aspect of the fundamental right to health, as well as a universally recognized human right, very different from “non-punishable” paths. The failure to accentuate the concept of dignity understood in a subjective sense, which had instead characterized the previous order n. 207/2018 of the Constitutional Court, is also considered positive. The Author wonders about the risks associated with a law on the matter, considered not strictly mandatory, for the very fact that the Court, after leaving a year to the Parliament to adopt a law on assisted medical suicide, decided to pronounce this judgment to remove the constitutional weak point (vulnus). Finally the Author notes how the drama caused by Coronavirus, a few months lather, has brought to light that the foundation of medicine, in reality, is not the patient's autonomy, his will and the same informed consent. The asymmetry between the patient and the doctor also became clear. The same myth of self-determination, as a perspective capable of interpreting the whole reality of relationships, has gone into crisis. Moreover many doctors gave their lives to assist the sick, certainly not for the ideal represented by the principle of informed consent or autonomy, but for the reason that doctor's duty is «the protection of life, physical and mental health of Man and relief from suffering», as stated by many Medical Code of Ethics in the world. The ideology of life unworthy of being lived appeared petty and distant from reality. In fact, the sense of humanity of public opinion turned with apprehension towards lives in danger, even those considered “a little unworthy”, and the heroic commitment of the physicians to them seemed admirable and “just”, because of the common human dignity.
L’articolo analizza la sentenza n. 242/2019 della Corte costituzionale, che ha riscritto l’art. 580 c.p., con una sentenza manipolativa e additiva molto dettagliata. L’aiuto al suicidio resta reato, ma non è più punibile colui che agevola l’esecuzione del proposito suicida nei casi in cui l’aspirante suicida si trova in alcune condizioni, verificate da strutture pubbliche del sistema sanitario nazionale e dai comitati etici territorialmente competenti. La sentenza, di carattere normativo derogatorio, viene criticata dall’Autrice in quanto apre una fessura nelle garanzie poste a tutela della vita, nonostante la stessa Corte lo definisca primo dei diritti inviolabili e presupposto per l’esercizio di tutti gli altri diritti; la sentenza si basa poi sul discutibile presupposto che rifiutare trattamenti sanitari equivalga al procurare intenzionalmente la morte, oltre che sull’idea che l’aiuto al suicidio possa qualificarsi trattamento sanitario, in disaccordo con l’opinione delle società mediche scientifiche. Tuttavia l’A. considera apprezzabile che la Corte abbia chiarito che dal diritto alla vita discende il dovere dello Stato di tutelare la vita e non quello di riconoscere un aiuto a morire; e che, di conseguenza, non sussiste alcun dovere dei medici di esaudire tali richieste. Altrettanto apprezzabili sono ritenute le affermazioni sulla priorità delle cure palliative, un pre-requisito di altre scelte, un aspetto del diritto fondamentale alla salute e un diritto umano riconosciuto universalmente, ben diverso da percorsi di “non punibilità”. Positiva viene ritenuta anche la mancata accentuazione del concetto di dignità intesa in senso soggettivo, che aveva caratterizzato invece la precedente ordinanza della Corte cost. n. 207/2018. L’A. si interroga infine sui rischi legati ad una legge in materia, ritenuta non strettamente obbligatoria, per il fatto stesso che la Corte, dopo aver lasciato un anno al Parlamento per disciplinare il suicidio medicalmente assistito, abbia ritenuto di pronunciare questa sentenza per rimuovere il vulnus costituzionale. Infine, l'A. osserva come il dramma causato dal Coronavirus, qualche mese dopo, abbia messo in luce che il fondamento della medicina, in realtà, non è l'autonomia del paziente, la sua volontà e lo stesso consenso informato. Si è evidenziata in modo chiaro l'asimmetria tra il paziente e il medico. Lo stesso mito dell'autodeterminazione, come prospettiva in grado di interpretare l'intera realtà delle relazioni, è andato in crisi. Inoltre molti medici hanno dato la vita per continuare a curare i malati, certamente non per l'ideale rappresentato dal principio del consenso informato o dell'autonomia, ma per il motivo che il dovere del medico è «la protezione della vita, della salute fisica e mentale dell'uomo e il sollievo dalla sofferenza», in accordo con le previsioni di molti codici di deontologia medica nel mondo. L'ideologia della vita indegna di essere vissuta è apparsa meschina e distante dalla realtà. In effetti, il senso di umanità dell'opinione pubblica si è trasformato con apprensione per le vite in pericolo, anche quelle considerate "un po’ indegne", e l'impegno eroico dei medici nei loro confronti è sembrato ammirevole e "giusto", a causa della comune dignità umana.
La sentencia no. 242/2019 del Tribunal Constitucional italiano sobre el suicidio asistido y consideraciones sobre la dignidad humana y el principio de autonomía a la luz de la pandemia del coronavirus / Razzano, Giovanna. - In: ITA IUS ESTO. - ISSN 2076-314X. - decimo quinta edicion(2020), pp. 119-131.
La sentencia no. 242/2019 del Tribunal Constitucional italiano sobre el suicidio asistido y consideraciones sobre la dignidad humana y el principio de autonomía a la luz de la pandemia del coronavirus
giovanna razzano
2020
Abstract
The paper analyzes judgment no. 242/2019 of the Constitutional Court, which rewrote art. 580 of the Italian Criminal Code, by a very detailed manipulative and additive ruling, after the previous order n. 207/2018, by which the same Court gave Italian Parliament one year to amend the current legislation in the sense indicated (without the Parliament obeying). According to the judgment, aid to suicide remains a crime, but the person who facilitates the execution of the suicidal purpose is no longer punishable in cases where the suicidal aspirant is in certain conditions, verified by public structures of the national health system and by the territorially competent ethical committees. One of the conditions is that the person is kept alive by life-support treatments and suffering from an irreversible pathology, source of physical or psychological suffering which he or she considers intolerable. The sentence, which is a “legislative” and derogating rule, is criticized by the Author as it opens a gap in the guarantees placed to protect right to life, despite the fact that the Court defines it the most inviolable right and premise for the exercise of all other rights; the judgment is then based on the questionable assumption that refusing health treatments is the same as intentionally procuring death, as well as on the idea that suicide aid could be qualified as health treatment, in disagreement with the opinion of scientific medical societies. However, the Author considers appreciable that the Court has clarified that from the right to life derives the State’s duty to protect life and not to recognize aid to die; and that, consequently, there is no duty of the doctors to grant these requests. Equally appreciable are the statements on the priority of palliative care, a pre-requisite for other choices, an aspect of the fundamental right to health, as well as a universally recognized human right, very different from “non-punishable” paths. The failure to accentuate the concept of dignity understood in a subjective sense, which had instead characterized the previous order n. 207/2018 of the Constitutional Court, is also considered positive. The Author wonders about the risks associated with a law on the matter, considered not strictly mandatory, for the very fact that the Court, after leaving a year to the Parliament to adopt a law on assisted medical suicide, decided to pronounce this judgment to remove the constitutional weak point (vulnus). Finally the Author notes how the drama caused by Coronavirus, a few months lather, has brought to light that the foundation of medicine, in reality, is not the patient's autonomy, his will and the same informed consent. The asymmetry between the patient and the doctor also became clear. The same myth of self-determination, as a perspective capable of interpreting the whole reality of relationships, has gone into crisis. Moreover many doctors gave their lives to assist the sick, certainly not for the ideal represented by the principle of informed consent or autonomy, but for the reason that doctor's duty is «the protection of life, physical and mental health of Man and relief from suffering», as stated by many Medical Code of Ethics in the world. The ideology of life unworthy of being lived appeared petty and distant from reality. In fact, the sense of humanity of public opinion turned with apprehension towards lives in danger, even those considered “a little unworthy”, and the heroic commitment of the physicians to them seemed admirable and “just”, because of the common human dignity.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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