In a monetary union, macroeconomic policies are strongly associated with externalities that imply the need for coordination. However, if coordination is not complete, it might be unable to cope with the externalities. This paper investigates different solutions for internalizing policy externalities. In particular, we compare wage coordination to the conservative central banker solution, which the recent literature has found able to impose wage moderation on labor unions. We also discuss some issues related to labor flexibility reforms as a solution for the unemployment problem.
Is a conservative central banker a (perfect) substitute for wage coordination? / Acocella, Nicola; DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni. - In: EMPIRICA. - ISSN 0340-8744. - STAMPA. - 31:(2004), pp. 281-294. [10.1007/s10663-004-0813-9]
Is a conservative central banker a (perfect) substitute for wage coordination?
ACOCELLA, Nicola;DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni
2004
Abstract
In a monetary union, macroeconomic policies are strongly associated with externalities that imply the need for coordination. However, if coordination is not complete, it might be unable to cope with the externalities. This paper investigates different solutions for internalizing policy externalities. In particular, we compare wage coordination to the conservative central banker solution, which the recent literature has found able to impose wage moderation on labor unions. We also discuss some issues related to labor flexibility reforms as a solution for the unemployment problem.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
