Nomos, «utile del più forte» e «bene altrui». Sul “Trasimaco” di Platone

Thrasymachus’conception of justice in Republic Book I as «advantage of the stronger» is a well-known problem in History of Political Thought, Political Philosophy and History of Legal Philosophy. Many scholars assume that Thrasymachus produces at least two (or even three) different definitions of justice, being the (supposed) second one the justice as «good of another» and the (supposed as well) third the political obligation for the ruled to obey the ruler’s laws; furthermore: some of them assume that those (supposed) two definitions are mutually contradictory. The paper tries to point out that there is just one thesis by Thrasymachus on justice, and that his position is unitary and coherent and – finally – that the assumption of the presence of more than one definition of justice depends on the fact that those scholars consider justice and law to be the same: which is not.