Constitutional Law 1/1999 for ordinary regions (and the successive 2/2001 for special regions) represented a fundamental turning point in Italian regionalism. It established the principle of direct popular election of the President of the region, which is connected to a prize of majority in the regional counsel, according to the so-called neo-parliamentary model. Any interruption of the fiduciary relationship upon the resignation of the President or approval of a lack of confidence motion would bring about new elections. That would present an extremely serious determent to potential crises. The reform also provides for the possibility for the regions to derogate that choice with their own charters, returning to the conciliar election and the substitution of the majority. Despite attempts to avoid the regulations of the legislature government using such derogation in an explicit and surreptitious manner following the old assemblyist legacy, direct elections have been put in place everywhere, guaranteeing similar and unprecedented standards of governablity in all the regions.

Federalism and Forms of Government. The Inappropriateness of Model Differentiation. The Good (and Persistent) Reasons for Constitutional Law 1/1999 / Ceccanti, Stefano. - In: BCN POLITICAL SCIENCE DEBATES. - ISSN 1696-0947. - 5(2007), pp. 61-78.

Federalism and Forms of Government. The Inappropriateness of Model Differentiation. The Good (and Persistent) Reasons for Constitutional Law 1/1999

CECCANTI STEFANO
2007

Abstract

Constitutional Law 1/1999 for ordinary regions (and the successive 2/2001 for special regions) represented a fundamental turning point in Italian regionalism. It established the principle of direct popular election of the President of the region, which is connected to a prize of majority in the regional counsel, according to the so-called neo-parliamentary model. Any interruption of the fiduciary relationship upon the resignation of the President or approval of a lack of confidence motion would bring about new elections. That would present an extremely serious determent to potential crises. The reform also provides for the possibility for the regions to derogate that choice with their own charters, returning to the conciliar election and the substitution of the majority. Despite attempts to avoid the regulations of the legislature government using such derogation in an explicit and surreptitious manner following the old assemblyist legacy, direct elections have been put in place everywhere, guaranteeing similar and unprecedented standards of governablity in all the regions.
2007
federalismo, forme di governo, riforme costituzionali
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
Federalism and Forms of Government. The Inappropriateness of Model Differentiation. The Good (and Persistent) Reasons for Constitutional Law 1/1999 / Ceccanti, Stefano. - In: BCN POLITICAL SCIENCE DEBATES. - ISSN 1696-0947. - 5(2007), pp. 61-78.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1552701
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