The essay examines the German Constitutional Court ruling declaring ultra vires a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union on measures taken by the European Central Bank for monetary policy purposes. The European Court, in a judgment declared illegitimate by the German Constitutional Court, found a programme of interventions in the government bond market approved by the European Central Bank in 2015 to be in conformity with European law. The article traces the structure and main argumentsof the German Constitutional Court ruling. It points out that this is in fact a dispute mainly under German domestic law, brought against national parties (Parliament, Government, Bundesbank), with direct effects in German law. Finally, it analyses the way to overcome the conflict between the German Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union, which risks undermining the unity of the European legal order.
Corte costituzionale tedesca, Corte di giustizia dell’Unione Europea e Banca Centrale Europea, ovvero oportet ut scandala eveniant / Clarich, Marcello. - In: RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMUNITARIO. - ISSN 1121-404X. - 30:3-4(2020), pp. 347-362.
Corte costituzionale tedesca, Corte di giustizia dell’Unione Europea e Banca Centrale Europea, ovvero oportet ut scandala eveniant
CLARICH MARCELLO
2020
Abstract
The essay examines the German Constitutional Court ruling declaring ultra vires a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union on measures taken by the European Central Bank for monetary policy purposes. The European Court, in a judgment declared illegitimate by the German Constitutional Court, found a programme of interventions in the government bond market approved by the European Central Bank in 2015 to be in conformity with European law. The article traces the structure and main argumentsof the German Constitutional Court ruling. It points out that this is in fact a dispute mainly under German domestic law, brought against national parties (Parliament, Government, Bundesbank), with direct effects in German law. Finally, it analyses the way to overcome the conflict between the German Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union, which risks undermining the unity of the European legal order.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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