The interplay between automatic and controlled processes: experimental contributions to dual-process theories of cognition

Since its beginnings, psychological science has frequently used dichotomous categories to describe behavior and mental phenomena. The most traditional dual models have impactfully equipped both the scientific and folkloristic psychological vocabularies of such dichotomies (e.g., conscious vs. unconscious, logic vs. creative, rational vs. emotional). However, while offering an affordable account of how the human cognitive system works, these models appear too simplistic. Substantially, they are grounded upon the findings obtained in decades of results in almost all the psychological fields, from perception to social processes, which have been later merged into a broad systemic theory of human cognition. However, this dual-system theory, which proposed to unify all cognitive dualities into System 1 (automatic, unconscious, fast, effortless, intuitive, and so on) and System 2 (controlled, conscious, slow, effortful, rational, and so on) entities, lacks a systematic investigation of its basic assumptions: for instance, that the features are aligned within and complementary between the two systems. These properties are essential for the tenets of the theory since a systemic theory should postulate the interdependence and interrelation of the elements constituting a system. In this view, the central thread linking all the experimental contributions in the present work is that the dual-system theory should resist when investigating cognitive performance either at low- and at high-level of complexity (complexity defined as the variety of mechanisms implicated in the phenomena of interest). Through seven studies conducted in three research lines, addressing temporal attention, task-switching, and decision-making, the interaction between automatic and controlled features in each process has shown to be the rule rather than the exception. Thus, the results presented in this work support the idea that the dual-system theory current formulation has a weak explanatory power, suggesting that decomposition approaches aimed at disentangling the contribution of qualitatively and quantitatively different mechanisms in each cognitive process are needed to advance or put aside dual-process theories.