In the present paper we study the efficiency properties of competitive equilibria in economies with hidden action and multiple goods. We borrow the description of the economy from Lisboa [3] and we apply a method of proof close in spirit to the one used in the literature on incomplete financial markets economies. We are then able to show that Lisboa's original result of constrained efficiency rests crucially on the assumption of separable preferences and on the structure of uncertainty.
Efficiency of Competitive Equilibria With Hidden Action: The Role of Separable Preference / Panaccione, Luca. - (2004). [10.2139/ssrn.975911]
Efficiency of Competitive Equilibria With Hidden Action: The Role of Separable Preference
Panaccione, Luca
2004
Abstract
In the present paper we study the efficiency properties of competitive equilibria in economies with hidden action and multiple goods. We borrow the description of the economy from Lisboa [3] and we apply a method of proof close in spirit to the one used in the literature on incomplete financial markets economies. We are then able to show that Lisboa's original result of constrained efficiency rests crucially on the assumption of separable preferences and on the structure of uncertainty.File allegati a questo prodotto
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.