In a circular neighborhood of eight, each member contributes repeatedly to two local public goods, one with the left and one with the right neighbor. All eight two-person games provide only local feedback information and are structurally independent in spite of their overlapping player sets. Heterogeneity is induced intra-personally by asymmetric productivity in left and right games and inter-personally by two randomly selected group members who are less privileged (LP) by being either less productive or excluded from end-of-period feedback information about their payoffs and neighbors’ contributions. Although both LP-types let the neighborhood as a whole evolve less cooperatively, their spillover dynamics differ. While less productive LPs initiate “spoiling the basket” via their low contributions, LPs with no-end-of-round information are exploited by their neighbors. Furthermore, LP-positioning, closest versus most distant, affects how the neighborhood evolves.
Does heterogeneity spoil the basket? The role of productivity and feedback information on public good provision / Angelovski, Andrej; Di Cagno, Daniela; Güth, Werner; Marazzi, Francesca; Panaccione, Luca. - In: JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 2214-8043. - 77:(2018), pp. 40-49. [10.1016/j.socec.2018.09.006]
Does heterogeneity spoil the basket? The role of productivity and feedback information on public good provision
Panaccione, Luca
2018
Abstract
In a circular neighborhood of eight, each member contributes repeatedly to two local public goods, one with the left and one with the right neighbor. All eight two-person games provide only local feedback information and are structurally independent in spite of their overlapping player sets. Heterogeneity is induced intra-personally by asymmetric productivity in left and right games and inter-personally by two randomly selected group members who are less privileged (LP) by being either less productive or excluded from end-of-period feedback information about their payoffs and neighbors’ contributions. Although both LP-types let the neighborhood as a whole evolve less cooperatively, their spillover dynamics differ. While less productive LPs initiate “spoiling the basket” via their low contributions, LPs with no-end-of-round information are exploited by their neighbors. Furthermore, LP-positioning, closest versus most distant, affects how the neighborhood evolves.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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