The electricity market in its delicate balance between profit and public utilities: a proposal in a systemic view

Abstract The article addresses the broad theme of the related party transactions (RPTs) and criteria for a related party definition, focusing on problems affecting the utilities to the reforms of privatization and regulation of their markets and considering in particular the field of electricity. These aspects are in fact problems of significant impact on strategic, organizational and managerial. The study has different purposes: (a) to shed light on a topic, that, despite its potential impact, has not yet deserved great attention in governance studies; (b) to stress possible inconsistencies in the most popular theories in the literature regarding RPTs (conflict of interests and efficient transaction), both, to some extent, ideologically biased and unable to offer a proper picture of these heterogeneous dealings; (c) to suggest a more balanced and pragmatic approach, less influenced by a suspicious attitude (typical of the conflict of interests theory), possibly more consistent with their economic rationale (as suggested by the efficient transactions hypothesis) as well as social fac-tors and governance practices. To this end the study is largely based on literature review and on the analysis of the characters that in the past and today have characterized the Italian electricity sector.