The role of institutional investors in corporate governance has recently come back to the foreground following the European legislator renewed attention. The recent legislative provisions on the long-term engagement of the listed companies shareholders, (EU Directive 2017/82, Legislative Decree 49/2019), suggest a research on how much the new rules favor greater engagement by institutional shareholders, how much they affect business efficiency and stability and how much they affect the performance. The new provisions underline the interest of the legislator to promote, by strengthening the engagement of the shareholders, the development of longterm strategies, more attentive to the industrial profile. This is in line with the soft law provisions (the Stewardship principles and the recommendations of the self-regulatory code of listed companies, renewed in January 2020) envisaged for both issuing companies and assets managers who indicate how the respective best practice meet where they are aimed at the development, stability and sustainability of the company. Departing from recent regulatory interventions, the research intends to highlight how the provisions cannot be enough in order to overcome problems and encourage management strategies changes. Instead, a further step is required that leads the subjects involved in the engagement and in corporate management to mutually recognize their respective interests in order to favor governance choices for which the business efficiency and continuity are priorities.
La direttiva Shareholder Rights II e il nuovo ruolo degli investitori istituzionali nelle società per azioni quotate. Dall’attivismo all’engagement nella prospettiva di efficienza e di continuità dell’impresa / Tedeschi, Claudia. - In: RIVISTA DEL DIRITTO COMMERCIALE E DEL DIRITTO GENERALE DELLE OBBLIGAZIONI. - ISSN 0035-5887. - 118:4(2020), pp. 557-589.
La direttiva Shareholder Rights II e il nuovo ruolo degli investitori istituzionali nelle società per azioni quotate. Dall’attivismo all’engagement nella prospettiva di efficienza e di continuità dell’impresa
CLAUDIA TEDESCHI
2020
Abstract
The role of institutional investors in corporate governance has recently come back to the foreground following the European legislator renewed attention. The recent legislative provisions on the long-term engagement of the listed companies shareholders, (EU Directive 2017/82, Legislative Decree 49/2019), suggest a research on how much the new rules favor greater engagement by institutional shareholders, how much they affect business efficiency and stability and how much they affect the performance. The new provisions underline the interest of the legislator to promote, by strengthening the engagement of the shareholders, the development of longterm strategies, more attentive to the industrial profile. This is in line with the soft law provisions (the Stewardship principles and the recommendations of the self-regulatory code of listed companies, renewed in January 2020) envisaged for both issuing companies and assets managers who indicate how the respective best practice meet where they are aimed at the development, stability and sustainability of the company. Departing from recent regulatory interventions, the research intends to highlight how the provisions cannot be enough in order to overcome problems and encourage management strategies changes. Instead, a further step is required that leads the subjects involved in the engagement and in corporate management to mutually recognize their respective interests in order to favor governance choices for which the business efficiency and continuity are priorities.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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