Grain stockpiles and public debt in Italy: a case study for an original relationship in the heart of Europe (1963-2000)

This paper aims to examine in more detail a little-known aspect of grain stockpiles in the aftermath of the Second World War; the particular aspect of the financial intervention linked with the compulsory stockpiles in Italy in connection with the financing of public debt. The transition from voluntary to compulsory stockpiles, though with some similarities in the technical procedures, had different objectives: the former pursed the protection of producers and the latter that of consumers; in the former the organization and the period of financing gravitated around the private sector, in the latter, state intrusion was more prevalent, which prevaricated on the private sector, having to intervene with legislative provisions. The state undertook the responsibility of an ad hoc food-rationing policy. Originally the ‘stockpile paper’ was no different, from the point of view of mobility, from the ‘common paper’ that banks presented to the Bank of Italy for rediscount and the Bank of Italy, in accepting them for rediscount, followed the same criteria used to accept ‘common paper’. The management of compulsory stockpiling was routinely completed over the year, since the revenue from sales of products was usually enough to cover running costs and, working backwards, to extinguish bank loans and therefore any loans from the Bank of Italy. It was subsequently established that funding was agreed every year with the ministerial bodies for the whole quota of bills created that the Bank of Italy was committed to rediscounting. With the entry into force of European Economic Community (EEC Regulation n. 19 the body of rules was completely overhauled.