This paper studies the dynamics of wealth distribution between workers and capitalists in a neoclassical growth model with differential saving rates. It shows that if capitalists are thriftier than workers and the factors elasticity of substitution is high enough to ensure endogenous growth, capitalists’ share of total wealth asymptotically tends to one. It is also proved that a tax on capital income shifts the long run distribution of wealth in workers’ favor, and that the capitalists’ share of total wealth is a decreasing function of the tax rate. The results of the paper are compared to Piketty's ‘fundamental laws’ of capitalism.

Wealth Distribution, Elasticity of Substitution and Piketty: An ‘Anti-Dual’ Pasinetti Economy / Zamparelli, L.. - In: METROECONOMICA. - ISSN 0026-1386. - 68:4(2017), pp. 927-946. [10.1111/meca.12157]

Wealth Distribution, Elasticity of Substitution and Piketty: An ‘Anti-Dual’ Pasinetti Economy

Zamparelli L.
2017

Abstract

This paper studies the dynamics of wealth distribution between workers and capitalists in a neoclassical growth model with differential saving rates. It shows that if capitalists are thriftier than workers and the factors elasticity of substitution is high enough to ensure endogenous growth, capitalists’ share of total wealth asymptotically tends to one. It is also proved that a tax on capital income shifts the long run distribution of wealth in workers’ favor, and that the capitalists’ share of total wealth is a decreasing function of the tax rate. The results of the paper are compared to Piketty's ‘fundamental laws’ of capitalism.
2017
class wealth distribution, elasticity of substitution
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
Wealth Distribution, Elasticity of Substitution and Piketty: An ‘Anti-Dual’ Pasinetti Economy / Zamparelli, L.. - In: METROECONOMICA. - ISSN 0026-1386. - 68:4(2017), pp. 927-946. [10.1111/meca.12157]
File allegati a questo prodotto
File Dimensione Formato  
meca.12157.pdf

solo gestori archivio

Tipologia: Documento in Post-print (versione successiva alla peer review e accettata per la pubblicazione)
Licenza: Tutti i diritti riservati (All rights reserved)
Dimensione 311.78 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
311.78 kB Adobe PDF   Contatta l'autore

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1460390
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 10
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 12
social impact