Asymmetry in mobile access charges: is it an effective regulatory measure?

Abstract This paper analyses the regulation of the market of voice call termination on mobile networks, by considering the remedy of asymmetric access charges and the hypothesis of discriminatory retail pricing. In the two way interconnection, the operators revenue depends on two factors: the retail price and the access charge. If the retail prices are different between calls that terminate on the same network (on-net) and calls that terminate on the rival network (off-net), the competition is more complex, involving positive networks externalities for the incumbent operator. In order to reduce the competitive disadvantage for new entrants and smaller operators many European regulation authorities have introduced the remedy of asymmetric access charges. This paper is aimed at analysing the effectiveness of this regulatory measure, assuming that operators are differentiated in terms of brand loyalty and cost structure.

Asymmetry in mobile access charges: is it an effective regulatory measure? / Cricelli, L; Di Pillo, F; Gastaldi, M; Levialdi Ghiron, N. - In: NETNOMICS. - ISSN 1385-9587. - 11:3(2010), pp. 291-314.

Titolo: Asymmetry in mobile access charges: is it an effective regulatory measure?
Autori: 
DI PILLO, FRANCESCA
mostra contributor esterni 
Data di pubblicazione: 2010
Rivista: 
NETNOMICS  
Citazione: Asymmetry in mobile access charges: is it an effective regulatory measure? / Cricelli, L; Di Pillo, F; Gastaldi, M; Levialdi Ghiron, N. - In: NETNOMICS. - ISSN 1385-9587. - 11:3(2010), pp. 291-314.
Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/11573/1459709
Appartiene alla tipologia:01a Articolo in rivista

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