— In this paper, we analyse the competition among interconnected mobile phone networks, under the following assumptions: i) discriminatory retail pricing, ii) asymmetry among networks depending on brand loyalty and degree of substitutability of offered services and iii) non reciprocal access charges. In the two way interconnection, the networks revenue depends on two factors: the retail price and the access charge. If the retail prices are different between calls that terminate on the same network (on net) and calls that terminate on the rival network (off net), the competition is more complex, implying positive network externalities for the incumbent operator.
Mobile Networks Strategies and Non Reciprocal Access Charges / Cricelli, L; DI PILLO, F; GASTALDI M., E LEVIALDI N. - (2006). (Intervento presentato al convegno 15th IST Mobile and Wireless Summit tenutosi a Mykonos).
Mobile Networks Strategies and Non Reciprocal Access Charges
DI PILLO F;
2006
Abstract
— In this paper, we analyse the competition among interconnected mobile phone networks, under the following assumptions: i) discriminatory retail pricing, ii) asymmetry among networks depending on brand loyalty and degree of substitutability of offered services and iii) non reciprocal access charges. In the two way interconnection, the networks revenue depends on two factors: the retail price and the access charge. If the retail prices are different between calls that terminate on the same network (on net) and calls that terminate on the rival network (off net), the competition is more complex, implying positive network externalities for the incumbent operator.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.