We study concurrent games with finite-memory strategies where players are given a Büchi and a mean-payoff objective, which are related by a lexicographic order: a player first prefers to satisfy its Büchi objective, and then prefers to minimise costs, which are given by a mean-payoff function. In particular, we show that deciding the existence of a strict Nash equilibrium in such games is decidable, even if players' deviations are implemented as infinite memory strategies.

Nash equilibria in concurrent games with lexicographic preferences / Gutierrez, J.; Murano, A.; Perelli, G.; Rubin, S.; Wooldridge, M.. - In: IJCAI. - ISSN 1045-0823. - (2017), pp. 1067-1073. ((Intervento presentato al convegno 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017 tenutosi a Melbourne; Australia [10.24963/ijcai.2017/148].

Nash equilibria in concurrent games with lexicographic preferences

Perelli G.
;
Rubin S.;
2017

Abstract

We study concurrent games with finite-memory strategies where players are given a Büchi and a mean-payoff objective, which are related by a lexicographic order: a player first prefers to satisfy its Büchi objective, and then prefers to minimise costs, which are given by a mean-payoff function. In particular, we show that deciding the existence of a strict Nash equilibrium in such games is decidable, even if players' deviations are implemented as infinite memory strategies.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1403146
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