Mental state attributions does not mediate attentional selection differences between gaze and arrows cues

Recent research has found that whereas eye-gaze selectively orient attention to the specific location or part of the object looked at, arrows unselectively direct attention towards parts of the environment. Although mental state attributions are argued to underpin this dissociation, recent research has indirectly disputed this claim, observing that attentional selection differences between gaze and arrow cues were not related to individual social abilities such as Theory of Mind or autistic traits. This study therefore aimed at further investigating this issue and to establish whether mental state attributions effectively modulate this dissociation. In Experiment 1, by using a Double Rectangle task, together with a technique commonly used to assess mental-state attribution, we manipulated whether the gazing agent could see the same thing as the participant (i.e., the target) or had this view obstructed by a physical barrier (e.g. a box). In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used with an arrow instead of gaze as orienting cue. We replicated the dissociation between gaze and arrow, and we found that it was not modulate by the presence or absence of physical barriers. In particular, with eye-gaze a cueing effect limited to the cued position was found even when the observed agent in the display could not see the same thing as the participant. These results suggest that, at least in the present study, the attribution of “seeing” modulate neither the gaze cueing effect nor the attentional dissociation between gaze and arrow cues.