attempts to test whether governments use environmental taxes in a Pigouvian or Leviathan way, i.e., whether they use environmental taxes to correct negative environmental externalities or whether they simply exploit them to maximize revenues. The authors adopt a dynamic panel model, estimated via the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator, and a sample of 26 EU countries observed over the period 2002-2016. The results obtained show evidence in favour of the Pigouvian hypothesis.
Environmental taxation: Pigouvian or Leviathan? / Cadoret, I.; Galli, E.; Padovano, F.. - In: ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE. - ISSN 0391-2078. - (2020).
Environmental taxation: Pigouvian or Leviathan?
E. Galli
;
2020
Abstract
attempts to test whether governments use environmental taxes in a Pigouvian or Leviathan way, i.e., whether they use environmental taxes to correct negative environmental externalities or whether they simply exploit them to maximize revenues. The authors adopt a dynamic panel model, estimated via the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator, and a sample of 26 EU countries observed over the period 2002-2016. The results obtained show evidence in favour of the Pigouvian hypothesis.File allegati a questo prodotto
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