Tax competition between states constitutes a recent form of competition between the various national sovereignties, inspired by the goal of attracting capital and businesses to the territory of the state through the use (even casual) of the tax levy. The State that intends to participate in this «competitive game» is called to configure a tax structure that is suitable for convincing economic operators - and typically multinationals - to locate in their territory the factors of production required for carrying out the business. In order to be attractive, this tax structure must obviously have an effective impact on the economic results lower than the average of the other States, and possibly tending to zero (or in any case to a minimum tax pressure). The calculation of economic convenience formulated by the State operating in tax competition is based on the assumption that the location of businesses and capital is able to compensate for the loss of tax revenue through an increase in other factors determining social welfare (direct employment of employees, indirect employment of companies and self-employed workers linked to multinationals, development of consumption, expansion of available capital etc.). A real «tax market» is therefore established in which the offer of a reduced tax levy constitutes the exchange commodity of the business establishment in the national territoryThe absence of heteronomous regulation mechanisms of globalization processes and the well-founded risk that tax competition takes on the characteristics of the wild dispute between States in order to continuously lower the tax levy have led to a general rethinking of international institutions (OECD, European Union) regarding the existence of an indiscriminate freedom to conform the tax system exclusively according to reasons of particular convenience of the individual State. Thus, the conviction of the importance of greater coordination of the tax policies of the countries was clarified in order to avoid new laws whose main effect consisted in the erosion of the tax base of other States. On the other hand, the tax losses that have resulted from recent forms of international tax competition have increased the awareness that tax competition between states penalizes the identification of a tax balance, generating situations of «state tax crisis». Compared to the numerous and delicate issues raised by the issue of tax competition between States, this study aims to illustrate both the evolutionary path of the phenomenon and the more recent legal implications. The theme was thus addressed from multiple points of view, in order to provide an overall legal framework for the topic, at least in the current historical phase.

L’ordine internazionale della competizione fiscale / Boria, Pietro. - In: RIVISTA DI DIRITTO TRIBUTARIO INTERNAZIONALE. - ISSN 1824-1476. - Anno 2019:2(2019), pp. 7-32.

L’ordine internazionale della competizione fiscale

PIETRO BORIA
2019

Abstract

Tax competition between states constitutes a recent form of competition between the various national sovereignties, inspired by the goal of attracting capital and businesses to the territory of the state through the use (even casual) of the tax levy. The State that intends to participate in this «competitive game» is called to configure a tax structure that is suitable for convincing economic operators - and typically multinationals - to locate in their territory the factors of production required for carrying out the business. In order to be attractive, this tax structure must obviously have an effective impact on the economic results lower than the average of the other States, and possibly tending to zero (or in any case to a minimum tax pressure). The calculation of economic convenience formulated by the State operating in tax competition is based on the assumption that the location of businesses and capital is able to compensate for the loss of tax revenue through an increase in other factors determining social welfare (direct employment of employees, indirect employment of companies and self-employed workers linked to multinationals, development of consumption, expansion of available capital etc.). A real «tax market» is therefore established in which the offer of a reduced tax levy constitutes the exchange commodity of the business establishment in the national territoryThe absence of heteronomous regulation mechanisms of globalization processes and the well-founded risk that tax competition takes on the characteristics of the wild dispute between States in order to continuously lower the tax levy have led to a general rethinking of international institutions (OECD, European Union) regarding the existence of an indiscriminate freedom to conform the tax system exclusively according to reasons of particular convenience of the individual State. Thus, the conviction of the importance of greater coordination of the tax policies of the countries was clarified in order to avoid new laws whose main effect consisted in the erosion of the tax base of other States. On the other hand, the tax losses that have resulted from recent forms of international tax competition have increased the awareness that tax competition between states penalizes the identification of a tax balance, generating situations of «state tax crisis». Compared to the numerous and delicate issues raised by the issue of tax competition between States, this study aims to illustrate both the evolutionary path of the phenomenon and the more recent legal implications. The theme was thus addressed from multiple points of view, in order to provide an overall legal framework for the topic, at least in the current historical phase.
2019
concorrenza fiscale; international tax; trasparenza fiscale; beps; common reporting standard
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L’ordine internazionale della competizione fiscale / Boria, Pietro. - In: RIVISTA DI DIRITTO TRIBUTARIO INTERNAZIONALE. - ISSN 1824-1476. - Anno 2019:2(2019), pp. 7-32.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1383806
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