State-sponsored terrorism: la questione della responsabilità diretta degli Stati per il finanziamento del terrorismo dinanzi alla Corte internazionale di giustizia

The essay deals with the issue of State-sponsored terrorism and, in particular, it aims to analyze the question of State responsibility for financing terrorism under the International Convention for the suppression of the financing terrorism (ICSFT). The issue raised because the Convention does not contain an obligation for the State to not financing themself terrorism. The investigation focuses on the recent case before the International Court of Justice, concerning the application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The proceeding before the Court was instituted by Ukraine against Russia. Ukraine claims that the Russian Federation has violated its obligations under the ICSFT by supplying funds to illegal armed groups that engage in acts of terrorism in Ukraine and failing to prevent the commission of those acts. In other words, Ukraine invoked the responsibility of Russia to have, through its agents and organs, financed acts of terrorism in Ukraine. On Novembar of 2019, the Court ruled on the preliminary objections, raised by Russia, founding its jurisdiction on the case. However, according to the Court, State financing terrorism is outside the object and the scope of the Convention, because the ICSFT is a law enforcement instrument. The essay analyzes the Judgment of the Court, highlighting the most controversial aspects of the reasoning of the Court. In particular, the first paragraph concerns the procedural questions of the jurisdiction of the Court under the Convention. The second paragraph analyzes the interpretation of the Court regarding the object and scope of the Convention as suppression convention. The third paragraph examines the crime of financing terrorism, evaluating its nature as transnational crime and exploring the difference between transnational crimes and international core crimes. The third paragraph, instead, analyzes the relationship between the obligation to prevent and the obligation to not financing terrorism. Specifically, this part attempts to understand if the duty to prevention may imply the existence of an obligation to not financing terrorism. The last part addresses the issue of State responsibility for financing terrorism, taking into account, on the one hand, the relationship between the ICSFT and the international customary law and, on the other hand, the relationship between the ICSFT and the regime of the internationally wrongful acts.