Governments often support their preferences for decentralized (centralized) bureaucracies on the grounds of efficiency considerations (production side). Here, we consider the demand side, i.e., whether the government perception of citizens’ demand for differentiated goods/services might increase efficiency by simply reshuffling bureaucratic production activities. We represent the budgetary process—between an incumbent governing party and n-competing bureaus producing differentiated goods/services—as a simultaneous Nash-compliance game with complete information. On these grounds, we analyse—in terms of public production, players’ rents and payoffs—the effects of increasing competition (as for the number of bureaus) in the political–bureaucratic market. Moreover, we evaluate, ceteris paribus, the effects of bureaucratic reshuffling from the point of view of society, assumed to prefer those policies that approximate social efficiency by minimizing bureaucratic and political rents.

Bureaucratic reshuffling and efficiency. Do n-competing bureaus determine inefficient results? / Beqiraj, Elton; Fedeli, Silvia; Tancioni, Massimiliano. - In: MATHEMATICS. - ISSN 2227-7390. - 98:7(2019), pp. 1-12. [10.3390/math7100998]

Bureaucratic reshuffling and efficiency. Do n-competing bureaus determine inefficient results?

Beqiraj, Elton
;
Fedeli, Silvia
;
Tancioni, Massimiliano
2019

Abstract

Governments often support their preferences for decentralized (centralized) bureaucracies on the grounds of efficiency considerations (production side). Here, we consider the demand side, i.e., whether the government perception of citizens’ demand for differentiated goods/services might increase efficiency by simply reshuffling bureaucratic production activities. We represent the budgetary process—between an incumbent governing party and n-competing bureaus producing differentiated goods/services—as a simultaneous Nash-compliance game with complete information. On these grounds, we analyse—in terms of public production, players’ rents and payoffs—the effects of increasing competition (as for the number of bureaus) in the political–bureaucratic market. Moreover, we evaluate, ceteris paribus, the effects of bureaucratic reshuffling from the point of view of society, assumed to prefer those policies that approximate social efficiency by minimizing bureaucratic and political rents.
competing bureaucracies; compliance games; bureaucratic merging
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
Bureaucratic reshuffling and efficiency. Do n-competing bureaus determine inefficient results? / Beqiraj, Elton; Fedeli, Silvia; Tancioni, Massimiliano. - In: MATHEMATICS. - ISSN 2227-7390. - 98:7(2019), pp. 1-12. [10.3390/math7100998]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1350953
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