This paper addresses the concern of whether the determinants of patent infringement and declaratory judgement suits may affect both long-term economic performance and wage inequality. In doing so, we construct a quality-ladder R&D-based endogenous growth model, in which the institutional setting for patent protection directly impacts the long-run private incentive to conduct R&D as well as to invest in human capital. We find that both the institutional setting and the Court's behaviour exacerbate wage inequality, while the steady-state effects on R&D effort and long-run growth are mixed.
A Schumpeterian model of wage inequality and Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement / Parello, Carmelo Pierpaolo; L., Spinesi. - In: RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA. - ISSN 0035-6468. - August-September:(2005), pp. 1-29.
A Schumpeterian model of wage inequality and Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement
PARELLO, Carmelo Pierpaolo;
2005
Abstract
This paper addresses the concern of whether the determinants of patent infringement and declaratory judgement suits may affect both long-term economic performance and wage inequality. In doing so, we construct a quality-ladder R&D-based endogenous growth model, in which the institutional setting for patent protection directly impacts the long-run private incentive to conduct R&D as well as to invest in human capital. We find that both the institutional setting and the Court's behaviour exacerbate wage inequality, while the steady-state effects on R&D effort and long-run growth are mixed.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
