A nonrenewable resource extraction game model is analyzed in a differential game theory framework with random duration. If the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of the final time is discontinuous, the related subgames are differentiated based on the position of the initial instant with respect to the jump. We investigate properties of optimal trajectories and of imputation distribution procedures if the game is played cooperatively.

Payoff Distribution in a Multi-Company Extraction Game with Uncertain Duration / Gromova, Ekaterina; Malakhova, Anastasiya; Palestini, Arsen. - In: MATHEMATICS. - ISSN 2227-7390. - 6:9(2018). [10.3390/math6090165]

Payoff Distribution in a Multi-Company Extraction Game with Uncertain Duration

Arsen Palestini
Ultimo
2018

Abstract

A nonrenewable resource extraction game model is analyzed in a differential game theory framework with random duration. If the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of the final time is discontinuous, the related subgames are differentiated based on the position of the initial instant with respect to the jump. We investigate properties of optimal trajectories and of imputation distribution procedures if the game is played cooperatively.
2018
differential games; non zero-sum games; cooperative games; resource extraction; random duration; IDP procedure
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
Payoff Distribution in a Multi-Company Extraction Game with Uncertain Duration / Gromova, Ekaterina; Malakhova, Anastasiya; Palestini, Arsen. - In: MATHEMATICS. - ISSN 2227-7390. - 6:9(2018). [10.3390/math6090165]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1296808
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