Previous research suggests that deciding whether to lie to another individual involves a moral dilemma between the temptation to deceive to get a personal reward and the desire to follow social norms of moral conduct (social reward). A failure to achieve the social reward of honesty is very often associated with a subsequent sense of guilt. Consistent with this, guilt aversion has been considered one of the strongest motivator for honesty. On the other hand, sensitivity to primary reward is considered a promotor of dishonesty. Neuroscientific studies have shown that higher activity of insula (an area related to guilt) during resting state predicts lower deceptive behavior, while higher activity in the nucleus accumbens when reward is anticipated predicts higher rates of dishonest behavior. In a previous study, we showed that the act of lying was associated with decreased motor readiness, an ERP component linked to motor preparation and that this reduction was weaker in participants who report to feel low guilty for lying (i.e. manipulative people). In this study, we tested the effect of personal reward and social reward (guilt aversion) on the motor readiness to lie. We employed the ‘temptation to lie card game’ an experimental paradigm where participants could spontaneously choose whether to lie (egoistically or altruistically) or not to other players. We manipulated personal reward by modulating the economic reward magnitude available on each trial and the social reward by modulating the level of guilt associated to each decision (through the employment of low versus high social ranking opponent players). Our findings show that guilt and reward seem to act as opposing forces on the decision to deceive: guilt decreases the probability to make egoistic lies and increases the probability to make altruistic lies, enhancing honest behaviour. On the other hand, reward magnitude increases the production of egoistic lies and decreases the production of altruistic lies, pushing participants toward dishonest behaviour. Moreover, personality traits related to moral cognition (i.e. manipulation, impression management and moral disengagement) significantly modulate deceptive behaviour, confirming the importance of both situation and personal disposition. Moreover, we found reduced Lateralized Readiness Potential (LRP) amplitude and reduced Mu suppression (as measured by time-frequency analysis) for egoistic lies in the high guilt versus the low guilt condition. Surprisingly, LRP reduction was found when participants were lying in the high vs. low reward condition suggesting that even if participants were more tempted to lie in this condition (as showed by the behavioural results), the motor preparation of this response was cortically inhibited. Our findings confirm the importance of personal and social rewards in shaping interpersonal deception and provide critical evidence for a role of cortical motor preparation in implementing (im)moral actions.

Guilt and reward shape the neural correlates of spontaneous deception / Panasiti, MARIA SERENA; Ponsi, Giorgia; Monachesi, Bianca; Aglioti, Salvatore Maria. - (2016). (Intervento presentato al convegno XXIV Congresso Nazionale della Società Italiana di Psicofisiologia “Brains in Action: dalle Neuroscienze di Base ai Sistemi Sociali Complessi" tenutosi a Milano; Italy).

Guilt and reward shape the neural correlates of spontaneous deception

Panasiti Maria Serena;Ponsi Giorgia;Monachesi Bianca;Aglioti Salvatore Maria
2016

Abstract

Previous research suggests that deciding whether to lie to another individual involves a moral dilemma between the temptation to deceive to get a personal reward and the desire to follow social norms of moral conduct (social reward). A failure to achieve the social reward of honesty is very often associated with a subsequent sense of guilt. Consistent with this, guilt aversion has been considered one of the strongest motivator for honesty. On the other hand, sensitivity to primary reward is considered a promotor of dishonesty. Neuroscientific studies have shown that higher activity of insula (an area related to guilt) during resting state predicts lower deceptive behavior, while higher activity in the nucleus accumbens when reward is anticipated predicts higher rates of dishonest behavior. In a previous study, we showed that the act of lying was associated with decreased motor readiness, an ERP component linked to motor preparation and that this reduction was weaker in participants who report to feel low guilty for lying (i.e. manipulative people). In this study, we tested the effect of personal reward and social reward (guilt aversion) on the motor readiness to lie. We employed the ‘temptation to lie card game’ an experimental paradigm where participants could spontaneously choose whether to lie (egoistically or altruistically) or not to other players. We manipulated personal reward by modulating the economic reward magnitude available on each trial and the social reward by modulating the level of guilt associated to each decision (through the employment of low versus high social ranking opponent players). Our findings show that guilt and reward seem to act as opposing forces on the decision to deceive: guilt decreases the probability to make egoistic lies and increases the probability to make altruistic lies, enhancing honest behaviour. On the other hand, reward magnitude increases the production of egoistic lies and decreases the production of altruistic lies, pushing participants toward dishonest behaviour. Moreover, personality traits related to moral cognition (i.e. manipulation, impression management and moral disengagement) significantly modulate deceptive behaviour, confirming the importance of both situation and personal disposition. Moreover, we found reduced Lateralized Readiness Potential (LRP) amplitude and reduced Mu suppression (as measured by time-frequency analysis) for egoistic lies in the high guilt versus the low guilt condition. Surprisingly, LRP reduction was found when participants were lying in the high vs. low reward condition suggesting that even if participants were more tempted to lie in this condition (as showed by the behavioural results), the motor preparation of this response was cortically inhibited. Our findings confirm the importance of personal and social rewards in shaping interpersonal deception and provide critical evidence for a role of cortical motor preparation in implementing (im)moral actions.
2016
XXIV Congresso Nazionale della Società Italiana di Psicofisiologia “Brains in Action: dalle Neuroscienze di Base ai Sistemi Sociali Complessi"
04 Pubblicazione in atti di convegno::04d Abstract in atti di convegno
Guilt and reward shape the neural correlates of spontaneous deception / Panasiti, MARIA SERENA; Ponsi, Giorgia; Monachesi, Bianca; Aglioti, Salvatore Maria. - (2016). (Intervento presentato al convegno XXIV Congresso Nazionale della Società Italiana di Psicofisiologia “Brains in Action: dalle Neuroscienze di Base ai Sistemi Sociali Complessi" tenutosi a Milano; Italy).
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1287003
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