This paper builds a stylized simple sticky-price New Keynesian model where agents' beliefs are not homogeneous. We assume that agents choose optimal plans while considering forecasts of macroeconomic conditions over an infinite horizon. A fraction of them (boundedly rational agents) use heuristics to forecast macroeconomic variables over an infinite horizon. In our framework, we study optimal policies consistent with a second-order approximation of the policy objective from the consumers' utility function, assuming that the steady state is not distorted.

Rational vs. long-run forecasters. Optimal monetary policy and the role of inequality / Beqiraj, Elton; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni; Serpieri, Carolina. - In: MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS. - ISSN 1469-8056. - ELETTRONICO. - (2017), pp. 1-16. [10.1017/S1365100517000396]

Rational vs. long-run forecasters. Optimal monetary policy and the role of inequality

Beqiraj, Elton;Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni;Serpieri, Carolina
2017

Abstract

This paper builds a stylized simple sticky-price New Keynesian model where agents' beliefs are not homogeneous. We assume that agents choose optimal plans while considering forecasts of macroeconomic conditions over an infinite horizon. A fraction of them (boundedly rational agents) use heuristics to forecast macroeconomic variables over an infinite horizon. In our framework, we study optimal policies consistent with a second-order approximation of the policy objective from the consumers' utility function, assuming that the steady state is not distorted.
2017
monetary policy; bounded rationality; heterogeneous expectations
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
Rational vs. long-run forecasters. Optimal monetary policy and the role of inequality / Beqiraj, Elton; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni; Serpieri, Carolina. - In: MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS. - ISSN 1469-8056. - ELETTRONICO. - (2017), pp. 1-16. [10.1017/S1365100517000396]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1283135
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