Platon sur ΟΝΟΜΑ, ΡΗΜΑ et ΛΟΓΟΣ : théories du ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙΝ en Sophiste 261d-262e

In this article I examine Plato’s conception of λόγος, as a significant sequence (συνέχεια) of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα, with a detailed commentary of Sophist 261d-262e. I particularly discuss the following points: 1. Why the linguistic terms, in the case of a sequence of nouns or of a sequence of verbs, do not indicate any action or any absence of action (οὐδεμίαν ... πρᾶξιν οὐδ᾽  πραξίαν), any reality that is or any reality that is not (οὐδὲ οὐσίαν ὅντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος, 262c2-4) ? 2. What is the difference between “naming” (ὀνομάζειν) and “saying” (λέγειν) in 262d4-6 ? 3. What is the difference between the constructions: λόγος περὶ + genitive and λόγος + genitive in 262e-263a ? 4. More generally: is the truth criterion of λόγος established in 263b-d valid, retrospectively, for every form of σημαίνειν, including the ὀνομάζειν ?