This paper studies how interest groups allocate campaign contributions when congressmen are connected by social ties. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the contribution game and characterize the associated allocation of the interest groups’ moneys. While the allocations are generally complex functions of the environment (the voting function, the legislators’ preferences, and the social network topology), they are simple, monotonically increasing functions of the respective legislators’ Katz-Bonacich centralities. Using data on the 109th–113th Congresses and on congressmen’s alumni connections, we estimate themodel and find evidence supporting its predictions.
Influencing connected legislators / Battaglini, M.; Patacchini, E.. - In: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. - ISSN 1537-534X. - STAMPA. - (2018). [10.1086/700074]
Influencing connected legislators
Battaglini M.;Patacchini E.
2018
Abstract
This paper studies how interest groups allocate campaign contributions when congressmen are connected by social ties. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the contribution game and characterize the associated allocation of the interest groups’ moneys. While the allocations are generally complex functions of the environment (the voting function, the legislators’ preferences, and the social network topology), they are simple, monotonically increasing functions of the respective legislators’ Katz-Bonacich centralities. Using data on the 109th–113th Congresses and on congressmen’s alumni connections, we estimate themodel and find evidence supporting its predictions.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
Battaglini_Connected-legislators_2018.pdf
accesso aperto
Tipologia:
Versione editoriale (versione pubblicata con il layout dell'editore)
Licenza:
Tutti i diritti riservati (All rights reserved)
Dimensione
395.2 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
395.2 kB | Adobe PDF |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.