In this work we present a Global Emission Game with N asymmetric players, in which the pay-off of cooperators is affected by a Social Externalities, that we assume to be a positive function. We refer to the notion of self-enforcing agreements to study the stability of the coalition and we assume that the N players are divided in two homogeneous groups, developed and developing countries. Moreover, the externalities doesn’t depend on emissions, but only on the number of players in coalition. So, it has no effects on the choice of optimal emissions, but only on the stability of the coalition.

International Environmental Agreements with Social Externalities: A Global Emission Game with Asymmetric Players / Mallozzi, Lina; Patri', Stefano; Sacco, Armando. - In: APPLIED MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES. - ISSN 1312-885X. - STAMPA. - 10:35(2016), pp. 1731-1746. [10.12988/ams.2016.6259]

International Environmental Agreements with Social Externalities: A Global Emission Game with Asymmetric Players

Stefano Patrı̀;Armando Sacco
2016

Abstract

In this work we present a Global Emission Game with N asymmetric players, in which the pay-off of cooperators is affected by a Social Externalities, that we assume to be a positive function. We refer to the notion of self-enforcing agreements to study the stability of the coalition and we assume that the N players are divided in two homogeneous groups, developed and developing countries. Moreover, the externalities doesn’t depend on emissions, but only on the number of players in coalition. So, it has no effects on the choice of optimal emissions, but only on the stability of the coalition.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11573/1035086
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