In this work we study an N-player differential game, in which positive social externalities affect the payoffs of the players when they make an agreement. We divide the N players in two homogeneous groups, N 1 developed countries and N 2 developing countries. For the latter, we consider a damage-cost function that evolves in time. We imagine the externalities as the possibility that bilateral or multilateral agreements of various nature are by-products of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). After the determination of emissions solutions, we use the externalities to investigate whether it is possible to have a self-enforcing agreement on pollution emissions in the short run.

Differential Game Approach for International Environmental Agreements with Social Externalities / Mallozzi, Lina; Patri', Stefano; Sacco, Armando. - In: ACTA UNIVERSITATIS CAROLINAE. OECONOMICA, CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW. - ISSN 1802-4696. - STAMPA. - 9:3(2015), pp. 135-154. [10.2139/ssrn.2649129]

Differential Game Approach for International Environmental Agreements with Social Externalities

Stefano Patrı̀;Armando Sacco
2015

Abstract

In this work we study an N-player differential game, in which positive social externalities affect the payoffs of the players when they make an agreement. We divide the N players in two homogeneous groups, N 1 developed countries and N 2 developing countries. For the latter, we consider a damage-cost function that evolves in time. We imagine the externalities as the possibility that bilateral or multilateral agreements of various nature are by-products of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). After the determination of emissions solutions, we use the externalities to investigate whether it is possible to have a self-enforcing agreement on pollution emissions in the short run.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11573/1035085
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