The paper addresses the problem of emulating a regular register in a synchronous distributed system where clients invoking $$\mathsf{read}()$$ and $$\mathsf{write}()$$ operations are anonymous while server processes maintaining the state of the register may be compromised by rational adversaries (i.e., a server might behave as rational malicious Byzantine process). We first model our problem as a Bayesian game between a client and a rational malicious server where the equilibrium depends on the decisions of the malicious server (behave correctly and not be detected by clients vs returning a wrong register value to clients with the risk of being detected and then excluded by the computation). We prove such equilibrium exists and finally we design a protocol implementing the regular register that forces the rational malicious server to behave correctly.

Building Regular Registers with Rational Malicious Servers and Anonymous Clients / DEL POZZO, Antonella; Bonomi, Silvia; Lazzeretti, Riccardo; Baldoni, Roberto. - 10332:(2017), pp. 50-67. (Intervento presentato al convegno 1st International Conference on Cyber Security Cryptography and Machine Learning, CSCML 2017 tenutosi a Beer-Sheva; Israel nel 29 June 2017 through 30 June 2017) [10.1007/978-3-319-60080-2_4].

Building Regular Registers with Rational Malicious Servers and Anonymous Clients

DEL POZZO, ANTONELLA
;
BONOMI, Silvia
;
LAZZERETTI, RICCARDO
;
BALDONI, Roberto
2017

Abstract

The paper addresses the problem of emulating a regular register in a synchronous distributed system where clients invoking $$\mathsf{read}()$$ and $$\mathsf{write}()$$ operations are anonymous while server processes maintaining the state of the register may be compromised by rational adversaries (i.e., a server might behave as rational malicious Byzantine process). We first model our problem as a Bayesian game between a client and a rational malicious server where the equilibrium depends on the decisions of the malicious server (behave correctly and not be detected by clients vs returning a wrong register value to clients with the risk of being detected and then excluded by the computation). We prove such equilibrium exists and finally we design a protocol implementing the regular register that forces the rational malicious server to behave correctly.
2017
1st International Conference on Cyber Security Cryptography and Machine Learning, CSCML 2017
Regular register; Rational malicious processes; Anonymity; Bayesian game
04 Pubblicazione in atti di convegno::04b Atto di convegno in volume
Building Regular Registers with Rational Malicious Servers and Anonymous Clients / DEL POZZO, Antonella; Bonomi, Silvia; Lazzeretti, Riccardo; Baldoni, Roberto. - 10332:(2017), pp. 50-67. (Intervento presentato al convegno 1st International Conference on Cyber Security Cryptography and Machine Learning, CSCML 2017 tenutosi a Beer-Sheva; Israel nel 29 June 2017 through 30 June 2017) [10.1007/978-3-319-60080-2_4].
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Note: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-60080-2_4
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1022936
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