Plato’s conception of the self. The mind-body problem and its ancient origin in the Timaeus

In this paper I examine Plato’s conception of the relation between soul and body in the Timaeus as an antecedent of the modern standard version of the mind-body interactionist dualism. The following points are discussed: 1. Soul and body as distinct substances (Tim. 30a-b; 41c; 42e-43a); 2. Soul and body as necessarily connected in a close interaction to give birth to the individual living being (Tim. 34c; 36e; 41d; 42a); 3. The modalities of interaction between soul and body (Tim. 34a-37c); 4. The “place” of the interaction between soul and body (Tim. 73b-d); 5. The nature of the interaction between soul and body as the proper “self” of the individual living being (Tim. 41a-44c; 69c-71d; 73b-d). These issues are related to some modern accounts of the status of the self.