We introduce some elements of Prospect Theory into a general equilibrium model with monoolistic competition in the good market and real wage rigidities due to (right to manage or efficient) wage bargaining, or to efficiency wages. We show that, under these types of labor market frictions, an increase in workers’ loss aversion: (i) reduces the equilibrium wage and in this way increases potential output; (ii) induces workers to work and consume less and in this way decreases potential output. If the former effect is greater (smaller) than the latter one, loss aversion increases (decreases) potential output. We also show that, under all the types of labor market frictions we consider, if loss aversion reduces equilibrium output, it also enhances the plausibility of nominal price rigidities.
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