The paper focuses on the judicial enforcement by the International Court of Justice of erga omnes obligations. While the concept of obligations erga omnes was enunciated for the first time in paras. 33 and 34 of the Barcelona Traction judgment, the main consequences of this kind of international obligations on the proceedings before the ICJ are still very controversial. By deeply analyzing ICJ’s jurisprudence since 1970, the paper tries to find answers to some very important questions: do all States, irrespective of individual injury, have standing to institute ICJ proceedings in the general interest in response to erga omnes breaches? Is it possible to configure a sort of actio popularis in the international legal order? Is the consent of states to ICJ jurisdiction always necessary? The authors admit erga omnes claims brought in defence of general interests of the international community. While not unequivocal, the Barcelona Traction dictum, as well as the successive jurisprudence of the Court, strongly supports this view. In any case, proceedings could only be brought against States that have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. The paper also examines the question of the relationship between ‘injured State’ and ‘States other than an injured State’ as to the content of the claims which may be brought before the Court.
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|Titolo:||La giurisdizione della Corte internazionale di giustizia e obblighi erga omnes,|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2013|
|Appartiene alla tipologia:||02a Capitolo o Articolo|