We consider a class of symmetric games with externalities across coalitions and show that, under certain regularity conditions, restricting the deviating power to majority guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations. We also show that if majorities canextract resources from minorities, stability requires a supermajority rule, whose thresholdis increasing in the extraction power.
Majority Rules and Coalition Stability / Sergio, Currarini; Marini, Marco. - ELETTRONICO. - 2-2012(2012), pp. 1-8. - DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER AND SYSTEM SCIENCES ANTONIO RUBERTI TECHNICAL REPORTS.
Majority Rules and Coalition Stability
MARINI, MARCO
2012
Abstract
We consider a class of symmetric games with externalities across coalitions and show that, under certain regularity conditions, restricting the deviating power to majority guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations. We also show that if majorities canextract resources from minorities, stability requires a supermajority rule, whose thresholdis increasing in the extraction power.File allegati a questo prodotto
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